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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2317 
___________ 
 
MATTHEW JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HARRINGTON DELAWARE POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE NUMBER 6, in Kent County, Delaware 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-00395) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2018 
Before:  VANASKIE, COWEN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 16, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se Appellant Matthew Jones appeals from the dismissal of his complaint as 
frivolous, and because it sought monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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such relief.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (iii).1  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm the judgment.   
Jones filed a complaint seeking $7 billion in damages against the Harrington 
Police Department and the Justice of the Peace Court No. 6.  He alleged that on 
September 23, 2016, an officer from the Harrington Police Department pulled over his 
vehicle because he was not wearing a seatbelt.  He maintains that he informed the officer 
that he “desperately needed medical treatment,” and that he had been the victim of 
numerous crimes, including that he was kidnapped at birth and held captive for thirty 
years by Linda C. Jones (who is listed on his birth certificate as his mother), and that 
there had been numerous attempts on his life.  The officer offered to call a “Mental 
Health Ambulance,” which Jones declined.  The complaint alleges that the officer issued 
Jones a ticket, rather than investigate the crimes against him.   
Jones also alleged that the Justice of the Peace Court “completely ignored crimes 
committed against me,” including that he was used as “a sex slave for the police, law 
enforcement, the criminal justice system, politicians, government officials and 
criminals.”  Jones asserts that he has suffered injuries as a result of the crimes against 
him.  As a basis for his action, he lists a multitude of criminal and civil statutes, including 
18 U.S.C. §§ 594, 1583 & 1589 (“Intimidation of voters,” “Enticement into slavery,” and 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Jones was granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.   
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“Forced labor”), and the first fifteen amendments to the U.S. Constitution, none of which 
he relates to the allegations in his complaint.   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review 
over dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), see Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d 
Cir. 2003), and over legal determinations regarding immunity, see Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 
438 F.3d 320, 324-25 (3d Cir. 2006).  A complaint is frivolous where it relies on an 
“indisputably meritless legal theory,” such as where the defendants are “immune from 
suit.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).  
To the extent Jones sought to impose liability on the Harrington Police 
Department for the acts of its police officers, the District Court properly determined that 
the claim lacks a basis in law.  The Police Department cannot be held liable in a § 1983 
action on a theory of respondeat superior, and Jones failed to allege facts demonstrating 
the existence of a municipal policy or custom that led to the alleged constitutional 
violation.  See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Mulholland 
v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013). 
We also agree with the District Court that Jones’ claims against the Justice of the 
Peace Court are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which protects a state or state 
agency from suit, unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state's immunity or the 
state has waived its own immunity.  See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 
U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1981).   The 
Justice of the Peace Court is a “court[ ] of record” in Delaware, vested with judicial 
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power by the Delaware Constitution, see Del. Const. art. IV § 1.  Shoemaker v. State, 375 
A.2d 431, 439 n.12 (Del. 1977).   As such, it is an “arm of the state” entitled to immunity 
from suit.  See Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 
1989) (en banc) (a state agency or department is an “arm of the state” when a judgment 
against it “would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment 
against the State itself”) (citation omitted).  Because Delaware has not waived its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the claims against the Justice of the Peace Court No. 6 
were subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 
We perceive no error in the District Court’s determination that amendment of the 
complaint would have been futile, as there are no factual allegations from which we can 
infer that Jones could have an actionable claim for relief.  See Maiden Creek Assocs. v. 
U.S. Dep't of Transp., 823 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that review of a district 
court’s futility determination is de novo).  Nor, in light of the foregoing, do we find error 
with its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any alleged state 
law claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. 
& N.J., 805 F.3d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 2015). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
